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Facebook Fallacies 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.∗ 
The papers prepared by the scholars contributing to this 
symposium are generally sympathetic to the concept that the 
material on a person’s Facebook somehow should be protected 
against unwanted disclosure on the part of the person whose face 
has been booked, so to speak.  I use the term “Facebook” to 
refer generically to electronic biographies of one kind or 
another, not simply Facebook, the copyrighted original. 
The papers are also very sober and well-considered.  They 
conclude that under existing law there seems little hope that 
such protection can be established under constitutional law, 
whether in the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.  Those conclusions 
seem to be correct. 
It is not that some such concept of privacy cannot be 
envisioned.  The contributors in various ways envision that 
concept.  Some such concept could find its way into 
constitutional law.  Indeed, the concept in fact found its way into 
constitutional law and remained there for a very substantial 
period. 
 
 
 
        ∗Professor Hazard served as Director of the American Law Institute, and 
his casebook, Law and Ethics of Lawyering (5th ed. 2010, with Susan P. 
Koniack, Roger C. Crampton, George M. Cohen, and W. Bradley Wendel), is 
a mainstay of American legal education.  Professor Hazard also produced the 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, which has 
become a model of civil procedure for international commercial disputes; a 
treatise; and many articles, particularly on joinder, including class actions, 
and discovery.  He currently serves as the Thomas E. Miller Distinguished 
Professor of Law at the University of California’s Hastings College of the 
Law, Trustee Professor of Law, Emeritus, at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, and Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law at Yale Law School. 
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I.  BOYD V. UNITED STATES, 1886 
The original occasion for such an event appears to have 
been Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  That case 
involved a forfeiture prosecution for fraud in the importation of 
goods in violation of the obligation to pay tariffs.  In presenting 
its case, the Government sought and obtained an order directing 
defendants, who were partners in the importing business, to 
produce certain documents involved in the transaction.  The 
Government then offered the documents in evidence, obtained a 
conviction, and defended the lower-court ruling before the 
Supreme Court.  The Court held that the compelled production 
was a violation of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
saying: 
[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers 
of the owner of the goods . . . is compelling himself to be a 
witness against himself . . . .” 
116 U.S. at 635. 
II.  FISHER V. UNITED STATES, 1976 
The decision in Boyd, and subsequent decisions to the same 
effect, was extensively reviewed by the Supreme Court in Fisher 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).  The Court in Fisher 
acknowledged that the Boyd rule had still been applied in 1921 
in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and indeed as 
late as 1957, in Curcio v. United States¸ 354 U.S. 118 (1957).  
But, as the Court noted, tension and contradiction had arisen as 
early at 1910.  In that year, in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 
245 (1910), it was held that no constitutional violation was 
involved in requiring a criminal defendant to don a garment 
worn by the perpetrator of the offense being prosecuted.  A 
cascade of cases in the 1960s had refused to find violations of 
the Fifth Amendment in incriminating acts such as a suspect 
being compelled to give a blood sample, or being compelled to 
demonstrate his handwriting. 
These changes in doctrine reveal what most candid 
observers have long observed:  That the judicial system in 
general and the decisions of the Supreme Court in particular, 
historically do not maintain a strictly straight line in adhering to 
precedent.  The question then arises whether the Supreme Court 
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might someday and somehow be persuaded that records such as 
Facebook entries should not be admissible evidence against the 
person who is their subject. 
III.  A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fisher was written by Justice White.  It is to be remembered 
that, before going on the bench, Justice White had a high 
position in the Department of Justice.  From the perspective of 
the Justice Department, there were important categories of cases 
in which access to “private papers” and the like was of great 
practical importance.  At the time, in the 1960’s, these included 
the investigation and prosecution of offenses such as tax 
evasion, securities fraud, organized crime control of gambling, 
and distribution of illegal drugs.  These offenses typically 
involved networks of participants whose members 
communicated with each other.  Having access to these 
communications, for example by wire-tapping, was essential as 
a practical matter to successful prosecution. 
Justice White in his opinion in Fisher did not mention this 
background, but he surely was mindful of it.  We can assume 
that other members of the Court had a similar understanding. 
If we shift focus to the present day, we must become 
mindful that an additional criminal threat is upon us, that of 
terrorist activities.  I do not wish to exaggerate the threat of 
terrorism.  However, the risks are real and evident in the Twin 
Towers attack of September 11 and lesser attacks and threats to 
our home territory, such as the attempted car bombing in 
Manhattan a couple of years ago.  There are also serious events 
outside our borders, including the attack on the American 
embassy in Africa and the attacks to which our military and 
other personnel are exposed in other parts of the world.  
Moreover, as one of the democracies, we must cooperate with 
those in Western Europe, Israel, Japan and other similarly 
inclined regimes to maintain the intelligence networks through 
which we try to keep these threats under reasonable control. 
The terrorist threat unquestionably requires aggressive 
intelligence gathering directed toward people who are trying to 
keep their activities secret.  We have learned that innocent 
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people can be made accomplices in financial, political and moral 
support of enemies of our country. 
IV.  PRIVACY PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD 
The resulting situation is that the investigative bureaus of 
the government must be allowed to gather information that 
could lead to bad-actors, as long as the means do not violate 
constitutional protections.  The legal question, then, is how the 
constitutional protections will be interpreted.  A person should 
not be subject to compulsory interrogation that would lead to 
self-incriminating answers.  That is the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment.  A person should not be subject to search and 
seizure of things as to which he or she has a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,” as the phrase goes, except on the basis 
of a proper search warrant.  That is the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court in recent years has stated and 
signaled that it will interpret these standards with realistic 
awareness of the problems in detecting and prosecuting not only 
offenses such as distribution of illegal drugs, but also the new 
threats from terrorism. 
V.  ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
When the problem of a Facebook entry is approached in 
these terms, it seems clear that the contents of such an entry are 
not immune from examination and use in evidence by 
prosecuting authorities.  On a somewhat different path of 
reasoning, it seems clear that they would not be immune from 
discovery in civil litigation.  The law has faced a somewhat 
similar problem regarding email.  Many people have thought 
that emails should somehow be immune from exposure in 
discovery in civil cases and exposure in criminal cases.  It is 
now clear that email is subject to exposure.  Indeed, a colleague 
has suggested that the “e” in email stands for “Exhibit.” 
Lawyers have had a better understanding of the situation.  
They know that committing a thought to writing makes it 
difficult and often impossible to later qualify what has been said 
in writing, let alone contradict it.  They know that this difficulty 
will be confronted even for emails that were written hastily or 
by someone who did not know what he was talking about.  They 
know that discussion of critically important issues should, if 
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possible, be conducted orally and only then memorialized in a 
considered formulation. 
Lawyers have learned to conduct their own affairs in this 
fashion; for example, during internal law firm review of possible 
mishandling of a client matter.  They have sought to educate 
their clients toward a similar approach in the clients’ internal 
deliberations.  The role of inside legal counsel is strategically 
important in this regard. 
Similar awareness should be addressed to Facebook entries.  
Lawyers should be cautious about what they say of themselves, 
or let other people say of them.  They should counsel clients to 
be similarly aware.  It is not that keeping written forms under 
control allows for fabricating testimony after the event.  That 
certainly can happen.  But awareness of the kind I have 
suggested recognizes that electronic writing often suffers from 
the imprecision involved in oral spontaneity, but yields a record 
having the formality of a written contract or deed.  In a world 
where all evidence is imperfect that is a risk that an ethical 
lawyer must attend to. 
 
 
